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Abstract
In recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have
been leveled with respect to climate protection. We show thatt h i sc o n v e r -
gence inparty platforms can beexplained bysuccessful international climate
agreements. We set up a voting model where political parties differ in their
preferences for climate protection and where climate protection causes both
resource costs and distortions in the international allocation of production.
Successful international agreements, which increase climate protection, re-
duce effective abatement costs and affect traditional parties in a different
way than green parties, since a lower preference for climate protection im-
plies a higher price (cost) elasticity of demand. Furthermore, we point out
that increasing ﬂexibility and efﬁciency in abatement mechanisms is prefer-
able to forming a climate coalition that focuses directly on emission reduc-
tion commitments.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q54, H41, D72
Keywords: Climate Protection, Political Economy, Platform Convergence
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In the last two decades, a convergence in European politics and party platforms
can be observed (see Dorussen and Nanou, 2006). This is in particular the case
for climate policy.1 As a l i e n te x a m p l ef o rt h el a t t e ri sG e r m a n y ,w h i c hr e v e a l sa
striking continuity in anti-climate change action, though there have been several
‘ideological’ changes in government. In fact, all governments have not only con-
tinued the inherited policy, but also fostered efforts in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions (e.g., Blum and Schubert, 2009, pp. 91–101). The leveling in German
climate policy became most prominent when conservative Angela Merkel was
celebrated as ‘climate chancellor’ at the G-8 meeting in Heiligendamm in 2007.
Furthermore, her conservative-liberal government recently announced to reduce
emissions by 40 percent (compared to the 1990-level) until 2020, matching the
coalition agreement between the German social democrats andt h eg r e e np a r t yi n
2002.
Accordingly, several authors meanwhile state that the ‘greens’ have progres-
sivelylost their often claimed uniqueselling property in the ﬁeld of environmental
(climate) policy due to the success of civil-liberal partiesi ni m p r o v i n gt h e i rs p e -
ciﬁc scope in that policy ﬁeld (e.g., Bl¨ uhdorn, 2009). How can this convergence
in climate policy be explained and do green parties have to fear this development?
The present paper argues that the observed convergence in climate polices can
beexplainedbysuccessful internationalagreements, increasingclimateprotection
and decreasing effective abatement costs. ‘Green’ parties lose their unique green
policy position, the more theseagreements allowfor ﬂexibilityand cost reduction,
since ‘non-green’ parties will react more elastically.
This is a novel contribution to the literature. Previous papers examined what
kind of climate policy measures are preferred by different interest groups (e.g.,
Svendsen, 1999, for the U.S.) or in which way different democratic systems affect
environmental policy (Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2007). Buchholz et al. (2005)
analyze international environmental agreements, but focuso ns t r a t e g i cv o t i n ga n d
the negotiation process, applying a very different approacht h a nw ed o .N e i t h e r
1Furthermore, there is also a convergence in international environmental policies across gov-
ernments, with different ideological backgrounds. See, e.g., Tews et al. (2003) and Busch and
J¨ orgens(2005).
2paper has endogenized the effective costs of climate protection, nor analyzed,
how implementing international abatement mechanisms lead to convergence in
the behavior of parties on the national level. Hence, our results contribute to the
literature on policy convergence of ideological parties, focused so far on repeated
games and two-level bargaining, by adding a new explanatory channel.
Alesina (1988)analyzes a voting model with two ideologicalparties, which not
only value being elected, but also have preferences on the implemented policies.
Assuming uncertainty about the distribution of voters, in particular about the op-
timal point of the median voter, Alesina points out that neither in one-shot games
nor in ﬁnitely repeated games complete policy convergence will emerge as long
as parties cannot be committed to their announcements in the electoral campaign.
After being elected, they will always implement their optimal policy. However,
in an inﬁnitely repeated election game, parties can coordinate and improve their
utility by policy smoothing. To this end, they have to choose identical platforms
and policies (and to share ofﬁces). Reputational losses and ar e t u r nt oao n e -
shot solution (i.e., a trigger strategy) in case of a one-timed e v i a t i o no n c ef r o m
the announced policies can sustain convergence in a time-consistent way, if the
discount factors for both parties are sufﬁciently high (i.e., if they are sufﬁciently
far-sighted).
Dorussen and Nanou (2006) pick up the approach of two-level games with
national veto-players (Putnam, 1988; Tsebelis, 2002) and refer to the thesis that
policy convergence on the domestic level restricts the government in the interna-
tional bargaining, improving its bargaining power. The authors extend this idea
by arguing that domestic parties strategically converge to aj o i n tp o l i c yi no r d e r
to improve the outcome on the supra-national level and, usingt h ep r o c e s so fE u -
ropean integration as example, they provide some empirical evidence for their
ﬁndings. Dorussen and Nanou (2006, p. 244) conclude that “policy convergence
may result from a ‘rallying around the ﬂag’ effect, in particular when the polices
coming from the EU level are perceived as a threat to the domestic status quo.”
While Alesina (1988) provides a rather static explanation, which cannot ex-
plain the change in platforms over the last 20 years, Dorussena n dN a n o u( 2 0 0 6 )
provide a convincing argument for EU integration, but their results imply that ex-
treme parties even divert and become more radical. This is notw h a tw eo b s e r v e
3in environmental issues.
Analyzing the example of international climate protection,o u rﬁ n d i n g si n s t e a d
imply that policies converge because of a decrease in effective abatement costs.
If climate (environmental) protection becomes less costly in terms of private con-
sumption and ﬁrms’ proﬁts, traditional parties2 react more elastically than ‘green’
parties on these cost reductions and the difference in their most preferred plat-
forms shrinks. Indeed, international agreements such as theK y o t o - P r o t o c o lh a v e
signiﬁcantly decreased abatement costs in the last 15 years,b ye s t a b l i s h i n ge m i s -
sion trading systems (ETS), installing a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and allowing for emission allowances from activities of ‘avoided deforestation’
(REDD).3 Therefore, we provide an additional and relevant channel, which can
explain the convergence of environmental party platforms across all types of par-
ties over time.
In a one-dimensional voting setting, green parties do not need to fear this de-
velopment, but this can change if the model is extended to a multi-dimensional
approach. Indeed, strategic concerns in policy behavior might explain the failure
of the post-Kyoto conference in Den Haag in 2000 and the position of the Ger-
man green party in the debate on the nuclear phaseout. Furthermore, applying our
results to an international setting, it follows that investments into and coordina-
tion of efﬁcient and ﬂexible abatement mechanisms are preferable as ﬁrst steps to
spending resources on negotiationson more stringent emission reduction commit-
ments.
To derive our results, we set-up a model with n+1countries,whereproducinga
private good causes greenhouse gas (CO2)e m i s s i o n s .N a t i o n a lg o v e r n m e n t sr e g -
ulate emissions and fulﬁlling these regulations causes costs for price-taking ﬁrms,
harming their international competitiveness, and reduces proﬁts. Households con-
sume the private good and a global public good ‘climate protection’, but differ in
their preference for climate protection. Ideological parties offer a party platform
in each country, deﬁning a level of national climate protection. This model allows
to analyze what happens, if some countries form a climate coalition, which ei-
2By our deﬁnition, traditional parties are primarily interested in private consumption, ﬁrms’
proﬁts and economic growth and value climate protection lesst h a ng r e e np a r t i e s .
3See, e.g., Brandtand Svendsen(2002); Br´ echetand Lussis (2006);Angerand Sathaye(2008).
4ther agrees on a common level of emission reduction or on implementing efﬁcient
abatement mechanisms, which decrease resource costs of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section2i n t r o d u c e st h e
model. Then, section 3 discusses the effect of internationala g r e e m e n t so nt h e
party platforms of national parties. An application of the approach to international
negotiations on climate protection is provided in section 4.T h ep a p e re n d sw i t h
conclusions in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
We assume a world, which consists of n+1c o u n t r i e s ,e a c hi n h a b i t e db yac o n -
tinuum of households. All households consume an aggregate private good x.P r o -
duction of this good causes an additive atmosphere externality (Meade, 1972),
which we will interpret as CO2-emissions, causing global warming. Therefore,
households also derive utility from climate protection G,w h i c hi sp r o v i d e da sa
global public good by governments via regulating ﬁrms’ investments into emis-
sion reduction.
Firms All ﬁrms are price takers and the world market price for the consumption
good x is denoted by p.T h e r ei so n er e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁ r mp e rc o u n t r yi,s u p p l y i n g
xs
i(p) units to the world market and having pure production costs c(xs
i).
The government in country i regulates the emission of CO2 by enforcing a
national level of abatement effort Gi.T h e c a r b o n a b a t e m e n t i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o
production, viz., Gi ·xs
i,a n di n v e s t i n gi na b a t e m e n t( i . e . ,i nc l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o n )
causes resource costs pG per unit of Gi.H e n c e ,t h eﬁ r mi nc o u n t r yi faces abate-
ment costs pG ·Gi ·xs
i,a sw e l l . F r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo faﬁ r m ,t h eu n i tc o s t s
pG are exogenous; however, their level depends on the abatementm e a s u r e s ,b e i n g
implemented by the governments in international agreements.





5To simplify the analysis without affecting the main results,w ea s s u m ec o n v e x
pure production costs c(xs
i)=c
2(xs
i)2,w h e r ec > 0i sac o s tp a r a m e t e r .
Maximizing proﬁts implies price equal to marginal costs so that optimal pro-















This approach neglects any positive effect of climate protection on production,
i.e., innovations and growth in ‘green’ industries. However, it is straightforward
to show that incorporating such spillover effects will even strengthen the results
in this paper.
Households Population size in each country i is normalized to one and national
households only differ in their preference for climate protection. We assume the
utility function of a household h in country i to be
ui = xi+"ih·vi(G), (4)
where xi represents utilityfrom consumptionand where "ih·vi(G) is theutilityde-
rived from global climate protection. Assuming positive, but decreasing marginal
utility of climate protection, we have v 
i > 0, v  
i < 0. "ih is the preference factor
for climate protection of household h in country i.T h el a r g e ri s"ih the stronger is
the preference for CO2-reduction of household h in country i.
Ah o u s e h o l di nc o u n t r yi is equipped with exogenous income Mi and earns a
share in ﬁrm’s proﬁt ! 
i .S i n c ep o p u l a t i o ns i z ei sn o r m a l i z e dt oo n ea n dt h ep r i c e
of the private good is given by p,t h i si m p l i e sa na g g r e g a t ed e m a n df u n c t i o nf o r







6As climate protection by reducing CO2-emissions is a global public good (or
ap o s i t i v ea t m o s p h e r ee x t e r n a l i t yi nt h es e n s eo fM e a d e ,1 9 5 2), the total level of
climate protection G,c o n s u m e db yh o u s e h o l d si na n yc o u n t r y ,i st h es u mo fn a -
tional abatement investments. Hereby, we will assume that K = 1+k countries
are forming a climate coalition, which has agreed on collective action and which
implements the same level of protection Gc in all member countries. The remain-
ing n k countries choose their climate protection independently. Accordingly,
total consumption of the public good is given by G =( 1+k)·Gc +#
n
j=k+1Gj.
The fully non-cooperative case results for k = 0a n dGc = Gi.
Market Equilibrium The world market equilibrium for the consumption good













Substituting equation (3) for national proﬁts ! 
i and equation (2) for national sup-
ply xs
i






















Equation (7) implicitly determines the world market price p =
p(pG,Gc,Gk+1,...,Gn,k) as function of marginal abatement costs pG,o f
the levels of climate protection Gc and Gj and of the number of members in
the climate coalition K = 1+k.T o t a l l yd i f f e r e n t i a t i n g( 7 )e x h i b i t st h em a r g i n a l
effects of abatement costs pG,o fc l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o nGc and of the number of
















7The ﬁrst term on the RHS in equation (8) reveals a positive relation between









pG > 0. (9)
Higher marginal abatement costs, i.e., higher investment costs for reducing
emissions on ﬁrm level, increase production costs in all countries. By partially
shifting the cost increase to the demand side, the price of thec o n s u m p t i o ng o o d
will increase in the quadrat of the level of climate protection.





pG > 0. (10)
An increase in the protection level Gc within the climate coalition (in country i),
increases effectiveproduction costs in the ﬁrms of these countries. Ceteris paribus
theaffected ﬁrms willdecrease theirproduction,whichwillraisethew orldmark et
price. The price increase is the higher the more ﬁrms are affected, i.e., the larger
is the climate coalition, and the higher the protection level.









Am a r g i n a li n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fm e m b e rc o u n t r i e si nt h ec limate coalition
will increase the world market price, if the new member country k has to increase
its protection level (Gc > Gk). If so, the mechanism is the same as when the
climate coalition increases its protection level Gc.
Party Platforms As is standard in the political economy literature, we simplify
the voting problem and assume that voters have to decide on then a t i o n a ll e v e lo f
climate protection only. The climate preference parameter "ih  0i sc o n t i n u o u s l y
distributed over households in each country i and the median voter m in country
i has a preference parameter "im = 1. Note that "ih can be uniformly distributed,
implying "ih   [0,2],b u tt h i sd o e sn o th a v et ob et h ec a s e .
8Ideological parties differ in their preferences for climatep r o t e c t i o n . W ea s -
sume that there are at least R   4p a r t i e si nc o u n t r yi and we denote the climate
preference parameter of a party r by "r
i. "r
i < 1c h a r a c t e r i z e s‘ t r a d i t i o n a lp a r t i e s ’ ,
being primarily interested in ﬁrm proﬁts and private consumption, whereas ‘green
parties’ are characterized by a high preference for climate protection, "r
i > 1.4
Ap a r t yp l a t f o r mGr
i is deﬁned as the level of national climate protection an-
nounced by a party ri in country i,g i v e nt h ea b a t e m e n tc o s t spG,t h en u m b e ro f
member countries in the climate coalition, K = 1+k,a n dt h ep r o t e c t i o nl e v e li n
non-member countries, Gj.P a r t yri will derive its party platform by maximizing
the utility function in equation (4), given its preference parameter "r
i and taking
into account the effects on national proﬁts and the world market price.
Consequently, the national protection level Gr


















where we already made use of the national demand function (5).H e n c e , Gr
i is





















The last term on the left hand side represents the increase in utility if the coun-
tries in the climate coalition marginally increase their climate protection level.
The effect is the larger, the stronger the preferences for climate protection "r
i are.
The effect becomes also stronger, the more countries are member in the union,
viz., the higher is k.T h er e a s o ni st h a tm u l t i l a t e r a la c t i o nw i t h i nt h eu n i o nm i t -
igates the standard underinvestment problem for public goods, where free-riding
is always an option.
The total level of climate protection G is given by the sum of emission re-
4See, e.g., Wittman (1977, 1983) for ideological parties. Thea d v a n t a g eo fR   4p a r t i e si st h a t
we could drop the ideologycomponentand, alternatively, could assume that vote-maximizingpar-
ties are pickingthefavoredprotectionlevels ofdecisivevoters. Therefore,ourmodeliscompatible
with a standard median voter model in the tradition of Downs (1957), as well.
9ductions within the climate coalition plus the sum of unilaterally chosen climate
protection in all countries outside the climate coalition.5 Increasing climate pro-
tection, however, causes two kinds of costs. First,a ni n c r e a s ei nn a t i o n a lc l i m a t e
protectiondecreases proﬁtsofthenationalﬁrm, sincetheincreaseincostsislarger
than the increase in the world market price. This can be taken from the second
term on the left hand side of (13), where (n+1)p (1+k)pGGr




c > 0a n dn+1   1+k.D e c r e a s i n g p r o ﬁ t s d e c r e a s e d i s p o s a b l e i n -
come and with it private consumption. Second,a ni n c r e a s ei nGi increases the
world market price, see equation (10). This leads to a furtherd e c r e a s ei np r i v a t e
consumption. The latter effect is represented by the ﬁrst term on the left hand side
of (13).
Inserting maximum proﬁts from equation (3) as well as the supply function in



































i ·v  
i (G) < 0,
which is fulﬁlled at least as long as the subutility function over climate protection,
vi(G),i ss u f ﬁ c i e n t l yc o n c a v e .
Climate Coalitions We deﬁne a climate coalition as a union of countries, which
either commit to a common level Gc of climate protection in all member coun-
tries i,i . e . ,Gi = Gc  i = 1,...1+k,o rw h i c ha g r e eo ne s t a b l i s h i n gi n t e r n a t i o n a l
abatement mechanisms, affecting resource costs pG of climate protection.
As u c c e s s f u lc l i m a t ec o a l i t i o ni st h e nau n i o n ,w h e r ee i t h e rany new member
country k has to increase its primal protection level to Gc > Gk.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,a
successful climate coalition implements an international abatement mechanism,
5For k = 0, we have the non-cooperative case, where all countries choose their climate pro-
tection unilaterally. The advantage of our chosen setting ist h a tt h ee f f e c to fw r i t i n gb i l a t e r a lo r
multilateral contracts on the party platform Gr
i can easily be derived by varying the number of
coalition members k (e.g., from k = 0t ok = 1).
10decreasing the resource costs pG.T h e l a t t e r f e a t u r e s t h e f o c u s o f c o o p e r a t i v e
agreements on cost-reducing, economically efﬁcient ﬂexibility mechanisms. Ex-
amples are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where countries are al-
lowed to fulﬁll their emission reduction by investing in developing countries,
which have a lower standard of energy efﬁciency and thereforel o w e rm a r g i n a l
abatement costs (see, e.g., Br´ echet and Lussis, 2006; Haites and Yamin, 2000,
Partridge and Gamkhar, 2010), or the establishment of international emission
trading systems (Buchner and Carraro, 2006).6 More recently, economic ﬂexi-
bility has been increased by including ‘avoided deforestation and forest degrada-
tion’ (REDD) in a post-Kyoto agreement as negotiated at the Copenhagen climate
summit in December 2009 (see Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 6).
Note that ‘successful’ in our terms only implies an increase in climate pro-
tection and a decrease in effective abatement costs; it does not need to imply an
optimal solution for climate protection. Hence, even if regime-effectiveness is
violated and all countries in a coalition do not increase climate protection more
than they would do in a unilateral setting, such a coalition would be ‘successful’,
as long as effective abatement costs decrease. Furthermore,w ea r em o d e l i n ge f ﬁ -
cient abatement mechanisms in an ideal world. In reality, these mechanisms have
to be designed soundly in order to avoid situations, where, e.g., CDM-measures
represent pure windfall gains, since they would have been implemented by host-
countries anyway, or where they even are counterproductive and increase global
emissions. See, e.g., Flues et al. (2010) and Partridge and Gamkhar (2010).
3P o l i c y C o n v e r g e n c e
We are now going to show that both successful international agreements on the
level of climate protection and implementing (economically) efﬁcient abatement
mechanisms will lead to a convergence in party platforms Gr
i in a country i.T h e
same holds true for cost-saving progress, improving abatement technologies.
6In fact, the International Energy Agency (2000, p. 234f) argued very early that fulﬁlling the
Kyoto-commitments necessarily requires implementing an international emission trading system,
since domestic measures alone would carry too high economic costs. Furthermore, the abatement
costs would decrease in the number of participating countries.
113.1 Forming A Climate Coalition
First, we analyze the effect of a climate coalition, where allm e m b e r sa g r e eo n
ac o m m o nl e v e lo fc l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o n . T h o u g hh i g h l ys t y l i z e d, this setting fea-
tures, e.g., the Kyoto-Protocol. The major difference here is that we assume an
agreement on identical protection levels, whereas in the Kyoto-Protocol countries
committed themselves to distinct abatement levels. However, our analysis can
furthermore capture the effect of a bilateral climate treatyb ye v a l u a t i n ga l lr e s u l t s
at k = 0.
We are interested in the effect of such agreements on the different party plat-
forms within one country, i.e., on the reaction functions of national parties. There-
fore, we do not solve for the equilibrium outcome of climate protection and we
do not examine under what conditions such a coalition is stable and incentive-
compatible. See, e.g., Besley and Coates (2003, section 5) for an optimal coop-
erative solution (and its justiﬁcation) in a centralized setting of providing local
public goods with spillover effects.
In our model, the effect of expanding the climate coalition ont h ep a r t yp l a t -
form Gr
i of a party with preference "r
i in a coalition country i can be derived from
implicitly differentiating the ﬁrst order condition (13). Focusing on a successful
climate coalition, country k,n e w l ye n t e r i n gt h ec o a l i t i o n ,h a sap r i m a lp r o t e c -
tion level being lower than the commitment level in the coalition, i.e., Gc > Gk.7
Hence, from (11), the world market price for good x increases,
$p
$k > 0, and ﬁrms’
proﬁts in all other countries increase as well, since $!i
$p = xs
i > 0  i  = k from (3).
However, the effect on the desired level of climate protection Gr
i is ambiguous.
Ap r i c ei n c r e a s ec e t e r i sp a r i b u sh a san e g a t i v ee f f e c to nc o n sumption and it will
depend on whether country i is a net exporter or a net importer of good x,w h e t h e r










Furthermore, there is a negative effect on the marginal willingness to pay, which
7This is also the most reasonable assumption, because it is hardly realistic that a country with
high protection level voluntarily joins a climate coalition, where it has to decrease its standard.
12decreases due to diminishingmarginal utility, when country k increases its protec-
tion level. See the appendix to Lemma 1 for the formal effects in detail.
Nevertheless, we can state that
Lemma 1. Assume country k joins a climate coalition. The climate protection
level Gr
i offered in any party platform in a coalition country i will unambiguously
increase, if the previous protection level in the joining country is sufﬁciently close
to the protection level in country i.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
If the difference in protection levels becomes sufﬁciently small (i.e., Gc  
Gk   0), there will be no price effect (viz.,
$p
$k   0) and there will be no de-
crease in marginal willingness to pay. Hence, we remain with the positive effect
of mitigating the standard free-riding externality in providing public goods, as
we have a partially cooperative solution, now. Note that Lemma 1 states only a
sufﬁcient, but not a necessary condition for an increase in Gr
i.
The interesting result, however, is the effect on the difference between protec-
tion levelsoffered by different parties in countryi.I n d e e d ,t h e r ew i l lb eap l a t f o r m
convergence, if enlarging the climate coalition raises the desired protection level
for all parties, i.e., for any preference parameter "r


























$k } = sign{
$Gr
i
$k } and where SOC < 0i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 1 4 ) .
Proposition 1. If a new member has to increase its protection level for entering
the climate coalition and if this increase raises the protection level offered in all
partyplatformsin countryi, then there will bea platformconvergence in the sense
that the announced protection levels across parties are converging to a common
value.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
The intuition behind this result is as follows: If more countries join a success-
ful climate coalition, their ﬁrms face higher production costs due to an increase
13in their protection levels, and the world market price for thec o n s u m p t i o ng o o d
increases. Therefore, increased national climate protection in any country i is
less harmful to the competitiveness of the industry in the country under consid-
eration. In other words, the more countries form a successfulc l i m a t ec o a l i t i o n ,
the less distortive national climate protection requirements will be, with respect
to the international allocation of production. Though, the increase in price p for
good x has ceteris paribus a negative effect on consumption, the total effect re-
duces effective abatement costs by reducing the indirect ‘economic’ costs for any
given resource cost pG of climate protection. However, the reduction in effective
abatement costs matters more for traditional parties, having a smaller preference
parameter "r
i than for green parties, since the former are relatively more interested
in proﬁts and private consumption. Consequently, traditional parties will catch up
and the level of climate protection offered in their party platform will approach
the level offered by green parties: we observe a convergence in policy platforms
deﬁned over environmental policy (i.e., climate protection).
The crucial assumptionin Proposition 1 is that forming a climatecoalition(and
signing a treaty on environmental protection respectively)e n h a n c e st h el e v e lo f
protection. Supporting evidence is indirectly provided by the fact that the Kyoto-
Protocol is effective in fostering environmental protection, though it is less dy-
namic than other examples and though there are some problems in its institutional
design. The European Environment Agency calculated for the EU-15 that the
Kyoto-induced additional effort – neglecting additional ﬂexibility instruments –
has led to an emission reduction of 6.2 percent by 2008 compared with a pro-
jected augmentation of emissions in a business-as-usual-scenario (European En-
vironmental Agency 2006, p. 5; 2009, p. 9). Incorporating further ﬂexibility
mechanisms should add an additional reduction of 4.6 percent( E u r o p e a nE n v i -
ronmental Agency, 2009, p. 11). In total, the EU would easily fulﬁll the 8 percent
reduction as required by the Kyoto-Protocol and most emission reductions are
attributed to EU-policy regulations.8
Besides the Kyoto-Protocol, there are many examples of international envi-
8About 82 percent of the emission savings in the EU-27 in 2010 are expected to be driven by
EU-Commission directives aiming to implement the Kyoto-Protocol. See European Environmen-
tal Agency (2009, p. 48f).
14ronmental agreements, e.g., the ‘Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer’ or the ‘International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
From Ships’ (MARPOL 73/78), which – in accordance with rationalist regime-
theory in the ﬁeld of international relations – actually caused a gradual enhance-
ment of national environmental protection standards over time and which were
backed by a broad consensus among member countries.9 These agreements and
the necessary national regulations were widely supported bya l ln a t i o n a lp a r t i e si n
the member countries.
Note, however, that the effect described in Proposition 1 does not change vot-
ing shares in a one-dimensional voting decision. We observe as h i f ti no p t i m a l
climate protection for each voter, but the distribution of voters remains the same.
Thus, the outcome of an election will not change as long as all party platforms
are adjusted accordingly. This may change if there are more dimensions besides
climate protection, as will be shortly discussed in subsection 3.3.
3.2 Introducing Efﬁcient Abatement Mechanisms
The alternative to committing to a certain protection level is an agreement on im-
proving the abatement mechanisms. One example is the designated possibility of
purchasing emission allowances from activities of ‘avoidedd e f o r e s t a t i o n ’i nr e -
gions with rainforests within the framework of a post-Kyoto climate agreement.
Investmentsin reducing emissionsfrom deforestationand forest degradationgrant
emission allowances, which can be traded in the European Emission Trading Sys-
tem (ETS); see Schlamadinger et al. (2005) for the so-called REDD-mechanism.
Such ﬂexibility in abatement mechanisms is considered as decreasing marginal
abatement costs, since, e.g., a REDD measure is less costly than traditional abate-
ment measures in industrial countries (see Anger and Sathaye, 2009).
Hence, the effect, which such agreements on efﬁcient abatement mechanisms
have on party platforms, corresponds to the effects of cost-saving technological
progress in abatement mechanisms. Thus, we are able to deal with both issues
by analyzing a decrease in (marginal) resource costs pG for providing climate
9See, e.g., Gehring (1994; ch.4), Victor (1995) and Z¨ urn (1997, pp. 48) for an overview and
summary of the effectiveness of older agreements.
15protection.
Simple intuition would tell us that the protection level Gr
i,o f f e r e db ya n yp a r t y
pi,s h o u l di n c r e a s ew h e ni t sp r i c epG decreases. Indeed, a decrease in resource
costs will increase a ﬁrm’s proﬁts in country i,a tl e a s ta sl o n ga sGc   Gj.T h e
decrease in production costs is of ﬁrst order and dominates the negative effect
from a reduced world market price p.S e eL e m m a2 .
Lemma 2. Ar e d u c t i o ni nr e s o u r c ec o s t sp G of climate protectionincreases proﬁts
in any climate coalition country i, if the protection level int h ec l i m a t ec o a l i t i o ni s
higher than in non-member countries, i.e., $!i
$pG < 0 if Gc   Gj.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
From Lemma 2 and the reduction in the world market price p,s e ee q u a t i o n( 9 ) ,








Thus, relaxing the cost of climate protection should increase protection levels.
However, ﬁrst intuition may fail, since there are opposing price and quantity
effects, and we cannot sign the change of climate protection offered in reaction to
ar e d u c t i o no fr e s o u r c ec o s t spG.L o w e rr e s o u r c ec o s t sm a k ec l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o n
per unit produced cheaper, but at the same time lower resourcec o s t si n c r e a s et o t a l
production. Hence, the combined marginal effect on ﬁrms’ proﬁts is ambiguous.
As i m i l a ra r g u m e n ta p p l i e st op r i v a t ec o n s u m p t i o n :t h ei n c r ease in the world mar-
ket price is lower for lower resource costs, but as householdsc o n s u m em o r eu n i t s ,
they have to pay the increased price on more units. Accordingly, the marginal
effect on utility in private consumption is also ambiguous. See appendix A.4 for
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Our main interest, however, is in comparing the magnitude of this change
across different parties. Fortunately, the effect of the preference parameter "i



















The interpretation of equation (18) is summarized as
Proposition 2. If lower resource costs foster climate protection in all party plat-
forms in country i, implementing an efﬁcient abatement mechanism, decreasing
resource costs of climate protection, will lead to a convergence in protection lev-
els offered by parties in that country.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Ad e c r e a s ei nm a r g i n a lr e s o u r c ec o s t spG will always have a stronger positive
impact on parties with lower preference for climate protection. Thus, no matter
if marginal abatement costs decrease due to implementing more efﬁcient mech-
anisms by an international agreement or by cost-saving technological progress,
there will be a convergence in party platforms as long as a costd e c r e a s ef o s t e r s
the protection level.
Thereby, improving the efﬁciency of abatement mechanisms asa ne x p l a n a -
tory variable should be of relevance. These improvements were already embed-
ded in the Kyoto-Protocol, where (i) a group of countries (e.g., the EU) can
assign emission reductions differently across member countries as long as the
group fulﬁlls its aggregate reduction (“EU emission bubble”); where (ii) coun-
tries can invest in emission abatement in other (non-treaty)c o u n t r i e sa n dc l a i m
the achieved reductions (“joint implementation”); and where (iii) special rules for
investments in developing countries are introduced (“cleand e v e l o p m e n tm e c h a -
nism” CDM), leading to a similar effect like joint implementation. Since then
efﬁciency has increased by more ﬂexibility in CDM measures (see EU linking-
directive 2004/101/EG) and by implementing the REDD approach on avoided de-
forestation. Furthermore, a global linking of different, regional Emission Trading
Systems (Anger, 2006) and including the transportation sector or households in
the Emission Trading System (Endres and Ohl, 2005) are under discussion at the
17moment.10
In any case, the convergence is driven by the fact that the reduction in private
consumption, which is necessary for increasing climate protection, is the smaller
the more abatement costs decrease. As traditional parties are more concerned
about private consumption and ﬁrms’ proﬁts, they react more strongly on this cost
decrease. Hence, the increase of climate protection in theirp a r t yp l a t f o r m sw i l l
be higher than for green parties, as the latter value private consumption less (and
demand climate protection less elastically, respectively).
Again, in a one-dimensional setting, there will be a shift in optimal climate
protection levels for each voter, but the distribution of voters remains constant.
3.3 Discussion
From our analysis it follows that, at least for a policy of internalizing additive
atmosphere externalities (i.e., for providing global public goods), there can be
other reasons for policyconvergencebesides repeated gamesa n dt i mec o n s i s t e n c y
issues (Alesina, 1988) and two-level games (e.g., Dorussen and Nanou, 2006).
International agreements on increasing climate protectionl e v e l so ro ni m p r o v i n g
abatement mechanisms can lead to a platform convergence in member countries,
if national parties (and voters) put different weights on, e.g., climate protection.
Theseagreementswillreduceeffectiveeconomiccostsofinternalizationandsince
parties with lower weights on climate protection value private consumption more,
they will respond more strongly to a cost decrease, implying al a r g e ri n c r e a s e
in offered protection levels compared to the increase in party platforms of green
parties.
This effect can be illustrated in a simpliﬁed diagram, see Figure 1. Assume
that effective marginal abatement costs (MC)a r el i n e a ra n dt h a tt h e r ea r e‘ l i n -
ear demand functions’ (MB)f o rc l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o n ,r e ﬂ e c t i n gr e a c t i o nf u n c t i o n s
of different parties in country i.T h e d e m a n d f u n c t i o n s a r e d r a w n f o r d i f f e r e n t
preference parameters "r
i,w h e r e"1
i > "2
i > "3
i .O p t i m a lp a r t yp l a t f o r m sf o re a c h
party ri in countryi are found by the intersection of its demand function MBir with
the marginal cost curve MC.T h e n ,t h ea n a l y s i sc a nb es u m m a r i z e di nF i g u r e1b y










3 i CP 1 i CP
Figure 1: Party platform changes in climate protection
examining the effect of a downward shift in marginal costs from MCh to MCl.
For all parties, a reduction in effective abatement costs will increase thelevelof
offered climate protection. However, the increase is largerf o rt r a d i t i o n a lp a r t i e s
than for green parties (%CPi3 > %CPi1), since the latter demand climate protec-
tion less elastically. Indeed, if the price (i.e., effectivec o s t s )o fc l i m a t ep r o t e c t i o n
dropped to zero, all parties would offer a full reduction in emission, viz., a protec-
tion level of 100%.
Can one infer from our ﬁndings that green parties should fear successful cli-
mate agreements? Our model shows that they do not have to in a one-dimensional
world, when the level of desired climate protection is shifted for the entire distri-
bution of voters. Though green parties will lose their uniqueg r e e np o l i c yp o s i t i o n
(i.e., their unique selling proposition), their share of votes can still remain very
stable in election outcomes.
However, the picture changes if one allows for multi-dimensional settings. As-
sume that voters consider two issues: climate protection andc r i m ep r e v e n t i o n .
For simplicity presume that both issues are independent of each other and that
green parties have a unique selling proposition in climate protection, whereas tra-
ditional parties are rather seen as competent in providing crime prevention. In
19such a world, a policy convergence in climate protection can have disastrous ef-
fects for green parties. Since the difference in climate protection levels shrinks
or even becomes marginal, crime prevention becomes the focalp o i n tf o rv o t e r s .
Consequently, green parties have either to adjust to the stricter crime-prevention
regime of traditional parties in order to preserve voting shares or they might be
marginalized, if they stick to their original party platform( e . g . ,i nc a s eo fi d e o -
logical parties). As an example might serve the secession of the so-called ‘realo-
fraction’ from the Swiss green party and the foundation of the( n a t i o n - w i d e )g r e e n
liberal party in 2007. Whilst the Swiss ‘greens’ are still very left-wing relative to
European average, the Swiss ‘green-liberals’ clearly movedi n t ot h ep o l i t i c a lc e n -
ter – and, for a newly founded party, have been relatively successful in their ﬁrst
election campaign (see, e.g., Baer and Seitz, 2008). In this sense, green parties re-
ally should fear successful international agreements on climate protection, though
these agreements lead to better climate protection.
In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that green parties have tried to prevent too
efﬁcient international agreements and in particular have opposed to implement
ﬂexible market mechanisms. A salient example is the 6th Conference of the Par-
ties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in The Hague in November
2000, where the French and German environmental ministers, being negotiators
on behalf of the EU, prevented a compromise with the U.S. administration.11 The
U.S. government preferred a market-based solution, including an extended con-
sideration of carbon sinks and emission trading, and credibly threatened with a
withdrawal from their Kyoto-commitments, if their claims should not be fulﬁlled.
In the end, the U.S. stepped back from the Kyoto-Protocol due to the opposi-
tion of the EU against a further extension of economic ﬂexibility. The failure of
this conference turned out to be a major setback for climate protection.12 After-
wards, many observers mainly blamed green party members or supporters from
the environmental ministries – especially the German J¨ urgen Trittin – to have
11At that time, bothministers, DominiqueVoynetandJ¨ urgenTrittin, weremembersofthe green
party in the respective country.
12Even compared to a situation, where the desired ﬂexibility mechanisms would have been cal-
low and less effective in reducing emissions, the withdrawalo ft h eU . S .f r o mt h eK y o t o - P r o t o c o l
created umpteen times more emissions. See Brandt and Svendsen (2002, p. 1191f) and Jacoby
and Reiner (2001, p. 302).
20strategically prevented a market-driven compromise solution (see, e.g., Jacoby
and Reiner, 2001, p. 301f; Vrolijk, 2001, p.167f; and Grubb and Yamin, 2001, p.
275).
Another example might be the strong defense of the agreement on nuclear
phaseout in Germany. Postponing the phaseout could eventually smooth the costs
of changing the energy mix, until sufﬁcient renewable energyi sa v a i l a b l e ,b u tt h e
German greens are not willing to discuss this issue at all. Following our analysis,
this might not be due to the fact that the nuclear phaseout is one of their founda-
tion principles (as often declared), but driven by the desiret ok e e pt h ec o s t so f
climate protection rather high.
Put together, the observed behavior of ‘green’ politicians might be explained
by strategic concerns in policy making in order to sustain their unique selling
proposition. Clearly, this issue deserves further analysis, but this topic is left for
further research, since it is beyond the scope of the present paper.
4A n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A p p l i c a t i o n
Our analysis can also be transferred to an international setting, by interpreting
differences in the preference parameter "r
i as differences in the national priorities
of climate protection.
Some years ago, the focus of both politicians and political scientists was ly-
ing on implementing ‘command-and-control regulations’, establishing a kind of
‘international government’ and enforcing commitments on emission reduction.
However, the negotiating history of the international climate protection regime
clearly shows that this kind of policy approach created too many conﬂicts with
other international laws and institutionalized normative principles. Examples are
the right to “catch up”, being guaranteed to developing countries in the Johannes-
burg Declaration of 2002, which then served as further justiﬁcation for developing
countries not to engage in national abatement obligations (Pohlmann, 2004), and
the ban of carbon taxes on imports (from countries with lax climate protection),
since these taxes are at odds with the free trade regulation oft h eW T O( P i t s c h a s ,
1995, Whalley and Walsh, 2009). Furthermore, the ‘command-and-control’ ap-
proach turned out to be ineffective (Nordhaus, 2006). Its failure became most
21obvious during the latest climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, hav-
ing raised doubts that successful climate agreements on protection levels (i.e., on
reductions in emissions) can internationally be implemented at the moment. One
reason shouldbe thatcountriesare stillwillingtoavoidlossesinproduction(stem-
ming from costly climate requirements) and in national purchasing power (due to
an increased world market price).
Therefore, most of the recent contributions to international climate policy
clearly favor market-based solutions. The majority of thesea u t h o r sr e c o m m e n d s
higher economic ﬂexibility, improving the efﬁciency of abatement mechanisms,
e.g., by connecting emission trading systems and by implementing CDM and
REDD, in order to decrease marginal abatement costs as much asp o s s i b l e .S e e
Endres (2010, part 5) and Whalley and Walsh (2009) for an overview. Others in-
clude mechanisms for technological cooperation (Buchner and Carraro, 2006) or
carbon taxes as a hybrid price-quantity solution(e.g., Aldye ta l . ,2 0 0 3 ;N o r d h a u s ,
2006). According to Brandt and Svendsen (2002) and Stavins (2008), making
global abatement measures more efﬁcient by ameliorating ﬂexibility-mechanisms
appears to be the only way of advancing international cooperation in this ﬁeld at
this stage.
Our results support this view. Implementing efﬁcient abatement mechanisms
and improving abatement technologies seem to be advantageous. First, produc-
tion costs and the world market price are decreased. Under mild conditions this
increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts and it increases consumption. This ist h em a j o rd i f f e r e n c e
to forming a climate coalition and committing to protection levels, where an in-
creasing world market price always has a negative effect on consumption. In that
sense a strategy for more ﬂexibility and efﬁciency would takei n t oa c c o u n tt h e
worries about the economic development of countries (as, e.g., being present in
reluctant countries like China, India and the U.S.). Consequently, countries are
more willing to increase their voluntary protection levels.S e c o n d ,i fi m p r o v i n g
abatement mechanisms leads to higher protection levels in all countries, we can
conclude from transferring Proposition 2 to an international level that there will
be a convergence in desired climate protection levels acrossc o u n t r i e s .C o u n t r i e s
with less emphasis on climate protection will increase theirv o l u n t a r yc l i m a t ep r o -
tection effort more than those countries which are highly concerned about global
22warming. Accordingly, it should also be easier to sign agreements with commit-
ments on protection levels in a second step, since the difference between national
objectives is leveled. Hence, we support the view in Endres and Ohl (2002) that
the “cooperative push” of an international environmental agreement signiﬁcantly
depends on the (correct) choice of abatement instruments.
In a nutshell, one policy relevant interpretation of our results is that the pri-
ority of climate policy should be investing resources and effort into improving
and implementing efﬁcient abatement mechanisms and providing (free) access to
these mechanisms. Such a strategy should foster international climate protection
in various ways and prove more efﬁcient than spending resources on climate con-
ferences (as, e.g., the Copenhagen summit 2009), if climate agendas of countries
differ a lot.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Analyzing a model of international climate protection, we have shown that the
convergence in environmental party platforms across parties can be explained by
successful international agreements. If these agreements decrease the effective
abatement costs, the optimal level of climate protection increases more for tradi-
tional parties than for green parties and the difference shrinks. This is driven by
the fact that traditional parties react more elastically on reductions in abatement
costs, since they are primarily interested in ﬁrms’ proﬁts and purchasing power
and appreciate cost reductions strongly.
Green parties do not need to fear the loss of their unique selling proposition
as long as there is only a one-dimensional voting problem. However, in a multi-
dimensional setting, the effect can be disastrous. Further research should clarify
whether green parties are well aware of this problem and strategically try to pre-
vent market-based abatement mechanisms and too efﬁcient climate agreements,
as indicated by some anecdotal evidence. If so, their guideline would be that
‘more climate protection is ﬁne, but at rather high costs, please’. Furthermore,
this strategic concern might also be the true reason for defending a very strict
position in the debate on German nuclear phaseout.
From an international point of view, it can be taken from our model that invest-
23ing into efﬁcient abatement mechanisms is preferable to climate summits which
fail because the objectives of countries are too divergent. Reducing abatement
costs ﬁrst by establishing efﬁcient and ﬂexible mechanisms should lead to a con-
vergence in national interests and should allow for signing ap o s t - K y o t oa g r e e -
ment on emission reductions in a second step.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Evaluating the ﬁrst order condition (13) for the optimal level of climate protection
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The effect of enlarging the climate coalition by country k on the party platform
of a party (and thedesired protectionlevelof avoter, respectively)with preference
parameter "r
































































(n+1)p pG from equation (11).
24The term in squared brackets in the ﬁrst line of (22) is ambiguous and in partic-
ular depends on the magnitudeof theprice effect on proﬁts !i and demand xd
i .T h e
ﬁrst term in the second line is positive, since xs
i implies p  pGG 
i > 0, whereas
the second term is negative if G 
i = Gc > Gk.
In case the difference between the protection level in the coalition and the orig-
inal level in country k is sufﬁciently small, Gc Gk   0, we can utilize
dp
dk   0
and both the ﬁrst line and the second term in the second line of (22) cancel. If so,






i > 0, (23)
which proves Lemma 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The effect of the preference parameter "r
i on the change in the desired and an-
nounced protection level G 
i driven by enlarging the climate coalition for country
k is obtained by differentiating equation (20) for "r





















The conditions in Proposition 1 imply G 
i > Gk and
$Gr
i
$k > 0. Recognizing from
equation (22) that sign{$H
$k } = sign{
$Gr
i
$k } and utilizing that the second order con-









< 0( 2 5 )
in equation (16). Therefore the increase in the offered protection level decreases
in the preference parameter "r
i for climate protection. Since a high preference
parameter implies originally a high protection level in the party platform, the dis-
tance between protection levels is reduced across platformsa n dw eh a v eac o n v e r -
gence in party platforms.
25A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The FOC (13) for the optimal policy platform can be rewritten as


































































(n+1)p3   0
cannot be signed in general. The reason is that a decrease in resource costs pG
reduces abatement costs per unit of production, but at the same time total pro-
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  0. (30)
The analogous argument holds true for the effect on marginal abatement costs in
private consumption. A decrease in pG fosters income and reduces the increase in
the world market price, but the still increasing world marketp r i c em u s tb ep a i do n
more units, because consumption has increased ceteris paribus. Again, the total
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However, if a decrease in resource costs pG increases climate protection Gi,w e
have $H










> 0f r o mv  
i (G) < 0a n d $H
$pG < 0.
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